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Abstract
In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for ﬁnancial
services, sellers have better information than buyers regarding the
matching between the buyer’s needs and the good’s actual character-
istics. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conﬂicts of
interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This
paper studies this issue in the market for ﬁnancial services. The anal-
ysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks’
price competition inﬂuences the ensuing incentives for truthful infor-
mation revelation. We compare two diﬀerent ﬁrm structures, spe-
cialized banking, where ﬁnancial institutions provide a unique ﬁnan-
cial product, and one-stop banking, where a ﬁnancial institution is
able to provide several ﬁnancial products which are horizontally dif-
ferentiated. We show that, although conﬂicts of interest may prevent
information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full infor-
mation provision for suﬃciently high reputation costs. In the presence
of switching costs or market power, one-stop banks will always provide
reliable information and charge higher prices than specialized banks,
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1providing a new justiﬁcation for the presence of one-stop banks. Also,
if independent ﬁnancial advisers are able to provide reliable informa-
tion, this increases product diﬀerentiation and therefore market power,
so that it is in the interest of ﬁnancial intermediaries to promote ex-
ternal independent ﬁnancial advice.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the provision of information by sellers of ﬁ-
nancial services to customers when the ﬁnancial products are horizontally
diﬀerentiated. The issue of information provision is timely, as the banking
industry is evolving from the traditional business of ﬁnancial intermediation
towards a fee-based industry where information is crucial in providing more
added value to customers. In a departure from the standard ﬁnance litera-
ture, we make the assumption that some investors are partially uninformed
in the sense that they don’t know the ﬁnancial product that best suits their
needs. This innovative assumption allows for a rich environment where diﬀer-
ent types of phenomena such as misselling of ﬁnancial products might occur.
Although information is valuable to customers, the sellers face a fundamental
conﬂict of interest problem: should a ﬁnancial intermediary tell a client that
another ﬁrm oﬀers a product that better suits the client’s needs? Our results
directly challenge the conventional wisdom that information is only credible
if it is produced from an independent institution that has no conﬂict of in-
terests. We ﬁnd that in diﬀerent environments, competition or consolidation
(into one-stop banks) can solve the apparent conﬂicts of interest.
In addition to horizontal diﬀerentiation and customers’ imperfect infor-
mation, our setting is characterized by two additional assumptions that we
deem natural in the ﬁnancial industry: non-veriﬁable information and repu-
tation costs for misselling. In a heavily regulated environment, the disclosure
of veriﬁable information can be made compulsory and any attempt to falsify
it can be heavily penalized. This then leaves open the issue of inducing rev-
elation of non-veriﬁable information. Since ﬁnancial institutions often care
about establishing a relationship with their clients, however, some discipline
can be imposed in the revelation of non-veriﬁable information through the
reputation costs institutions bear for giving misleading advice.
Although our research is originally motivated by the issues relevant to
the ﬁnancial industry, our ﬁndings apply to any market where buyers are
2uncertain about which product is best for them and where sellers face a
reputation cost if they provide misleading information. Examples of such
markets outside the ﬁnancial industry could be the market for drugs, where
information is provided by physicians, the market for legal advice, and the
market for sophisticated technical equipment.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Competition among
specialized ﬁnancial intermediaries leads to full credible information disclo-
sure, even for small but strictly positive reputation costs that are bounded
away from zero. The basic intuition for this result is that competition may
eliminate the potential conﬂict of interest by reducing the gains from lying
and by inducing banks to diﬀerentiate their product by providing credible
information. Banks can, thus, restore their margins on a smaller base of
customers that have a special need for their product. However, the size of
reputation costs limit proﬁt margins because of the need to remain credible
in giving advice to clients. As a consequence, sellers would gain from the
presence of a third party (for instance some independent ﬁnancial advisor)
that could provide information, allowing them to raise prices further.
One-stop banks (deﬁned here as banks that sell multiple products) can
also overcome this conﬂict of interest in certain circumstances. While the
usual explanation for the creation of one-stop banks is based on an economies
of scope argument that it is more eﬃcient to sell multiple ﬁnancial products
from the same outlet, we ﬁnd that the ability to credibly provide informa-
tion is another major motive for consolidation. One-stop banks are able to
provide reliable information and charge higher prices than specialized banks
when customers face switching costs or, more generally when banks have mar-
ket power. Otherwise, competition with one-stop banks results in a similar
outcome as competition with specialized banks.
The main theoretical novelty of the paper is that ﬁrms’ actions (the prices
they set) deﬁne an ensuing signaling game (the advice banks give to cus-
tomers). These actions commit the ﬁrms to credible or non-credible informa-
tion revelation by providing incentives to tell the truth or not. Most other
signaling models have payoﬀs determined by current or future actions, not
past actions as in our model. Moreover, these models have each ﬁrm signaling
its private information, such as in Mailath (1989). Here, the private infor-
mation is the information acquired by a bank about its customer’s ﬁnancial
proﬁle, which it can reveal as it wishes.
Our model incorporates several elements from the industrial organization
literature. As all customers are uncertain of which product they prefer, there
3are ﬂavors of both horizontal diﬀerentiation (Hotelling, 1929) and vertical
diﬀerentiation (Shaked and Sutton, 1983). In order to provide information to
customers, we assume that banks make unveriﬁable statements about which
product is best for the customer. This is a form of information revelation
game in which talk is not cheap. In contrast, most other models that have
been considered in the literature involve agents providing information that is
either cheap talk or veriﬁable. As is well known, when private information is
veriﬁable, voluntary disclosure often leads to full information revelation(see
Grossman and Hart, 1980, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986, and Okuno-Fujiwara,
Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990). In our setup, we allow for lying, but make
it costly by introducing a reputation cost.
The issue of the market provision of information prior to a sale has been
discussed in diﬀerent settings. For example Benabou and Laroque (1992)
and Morgan and Stocken (2003) discuss a similar conﬂict of interest to our
paper in the provision of stock recommendations. However, our analysis
focuses on direct price competition between information providers, while they
consider information providers that beneﬁt from subsequent movements in
the secondary market price of a recommended stock.
The environment we discuss resembles in some ways the literature on
credence goods. For such goods or services the consumer is never able to
completely ascertain the quality of the good and must rely on the advice of
experts (an example of a credence service is automobile repairs - all one knows
is whether the car functions properly, not whether the repair was necessary
or well executed). Several papers that discuss credence goods are interested
in credible revelation of information (Pitchik and Schotter, 1987) and in com-
petition among credence good providers (Pesendorfer and Wolinsky, 2003).
In our model, however, the ﬁnancial instruments are also partially experience
goods, since we allow for a reputation cost for misleading customers. Another
diﬀerence with the literature on information revelation and credence goods
is that prices are not signals in our model, but instead provide incentives for
information revelation.
Shavell’s (1994) contribution is close to ours in many respects. We focus
on the case where information is socially valuable and can only be acquired
by sellers, while he allows information also to have no social value and buyers
to acquire information. Investment in information is unobservable in Shavell
(1994), while we examine both observable and unobservable investment. The
largest diﬀerence is that we permit Bertrand competition between sellers,
whereas he focuses on buyer-seller relations where the seller sets prices.
4The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a description of
the model. Section 3 studies the benchmark case of monopoly banks. Section
4 considers information production and competition among specialized banks
and in Section 5 we study how incentives change when one-stop banks are
present. In Section 6 we discuss market structure and switching costs. In
Section 7 we study the case where the bank investment in the production of
information is not observable. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a model where two ﬁnancial intermediaries (FIs) compete by
oﬀering one or possibly two diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial products, which we
label simply as A and B. A working example which we will refer to through-
out this article is life insurance and pension funds, two substitute savings
vehicles with diﬀerent appeal for diﬀerent households depending on their tax
situation, savings horizon and idiosyncratic income shocks.
2.1 Customers
For simplicity, we take bank customers to be risk neutral households who
buy at most one unit of a ﬁnancial product from an FI.1
We assume that customers could be of two diﬀerent types, A and B,
reﬂecting their diﬀerent tax status, say. Type A investors matched with
product A derive a gross payoﬀ R, while when they get product B they only
get a payoﬀ r (r<R ). Similarly, for type B investors, when matched with
product B they get a payoﬀ R a n dw h e nm i s m a t c h e dt h e yg e tr.W ed e n o t e
by ∆ the diﬀerence R − r.
Customers do not know which of the two products is best suited for their
needs. For example, they may be unaware of important tax advantages of
one of the products or they may not be aware of speciﬁc contractual clauses
such as foreclosure penalties. We model this lack of knowledge as incomplete
information about their true type.2 Thus, all they know is the prior proba-
bility of being of type A, which is denoted by q. In addition we assume that
1An alternative interpretation may also be that customers are ﬁrms choosing between
alternative ﬁnancial structures.
2Equivalently, we could interpret this lack of knowledge as incomplete information
about the type of the ﬁnancial product that matches each customer’s needs.
5this prior probability is equal to the true proportion of type A customers,
and that q>1
2 (without loss of generality). Given this information and the
prices of the ﬁnancial products posted by the FIs, customers choose which
FI to approach. This choice will depend not only on the product’s price but
also on whether the FI is expected to provide reliable information on the cus-
tomers’ types. Should a customer approaching FI A,s a y ,o b t a i ni n f o r m a t i o n
that FI B oﬀers the best deal (better matched product at competitive terms)
then she will switch to FI B.W ea s s u m et h a tt h es w i t c h i n gc o s tt e c h n o l o g y
is such that a customer may switch between banks only once.
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
We consider two types of FIs, specialized FIs and one-stop banks. A special-
ized FI is one that oﬀers only one ﬁnancial product. A one-stop bank oﬀers
both types of ﬁnancial product3.
The cost of production for the two products is the same and is normalized
to zero. This means that the prices of the two products, pA and pB are to be
interpreted as spreads.
Although customers do not know their type, FIs may know which prod-
uct best ﬁts the needs of each customer. FIs can oﬀer an advisory service
and guide customers to the relevant product but they may face a conﬂict of
interest problem in their dual role as ﬁnancial advisors and sellers of ﬁnancial
products. This conﬂict of interest puts them in a position where they may
not be able to credibly communicate their information about a good match
to customers since they have an incentive to peddle their own product. Cus-
tomers understand this and will only follow an FI’s recommendation if it is
in the FI’s interest to truthfully reveal its information.
An FI’s incentive is driven in part by a concern to maintain a reputation
for honest advice and by competitive pressure, which limits the FI’s ability
to beneﬁt from its provision of information. To model this reputational
concern we assume that an FI suﬀers a reputation loss of ρ when a lie told
t oac u s t o m e rl e a d st oap u r c h a s eb yt h a tc o n s u m e r . O b v i o u s l y ,i ft h i s
reputational loss is very large then the FIs’ incentive to peddle their products
disappears. This is why we assume that:
3The terms universal bank or ﬁnancial conglomerate are also commonly used to de-
scribe a one-stop bank. We prefer the term one-stop bank since the ﬁrst term carries a
connotation of economies of scope and the second a connotation of regulatory arbitrage,
which are both absent from our framework.
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This assumption allows us to focus on the more relevant case where a
conﬂict of interest arises. If ρ is too large, then there is no choice but to
reveal full information since the ﬁrm will be strictly punished for not doing
so. Although we have placed an upper bound on ρ,w ea l l o wi tt ob ea sl o w
as zero, in which case we are analyzing a pure cheap talk game.
We restrict the customers’ strategies with the following assumption:
Assumption A2: There is a tiny amount of uncertainty about the actual
values of ρ and R,i . e .ρ ∈ [˜ ρ−ε1,˜ ρ+ε1] and R ∈ [ ˜ R−ε2, ˜ R+ε2] such that
ε1,ε 2 → 0.
For any small amount of uncertainty, however small, ﬁrms are unable to
set prices exactly at levels to make consumers indiﬀerent between choices(or
to balance the reputation eﬀect). Thus, this small uncertainty limits cus-
tomers to pure strategies and eliminates multiple equilibria.
2.3 Timing
1. FIs decide whether to invest in information provision technology.
2. FIs set prices. To simplify the strategic analysis we will give one of the
FIs a price leadership role (that is, one of the FIs moves ﬁrst in setting
prices).
3. Investors approach an FI, which then recommends a ﬁnancial product.
4. Investors make a decision on which product to purchase at which FI,
based on observed prices and the FI’s recommendation.
We begin with a brief analysis of monopoly banking.
3 Monopoly Banking
3.1 A specialized monopoly
Under no information provision, a specialized monopoly FI sets the monopoly
spread at either
r + q∆
for an A bank, or
r +( 1− q)∆
7for a B bank. Under full information a specialized bank either serves all
customers at a maximum spread of r or it only serves well matched customers
at a monopoly spread of R. The latter policy is optimal for FI A if and only
if
r ≤ qR.
It is obvious then, that either FI monopoly strictly prefers consumers
to be uninformed as it can sell to both types at a suﬃciently large spread.
Assuming that the specialized bank has the ability to convey information
about customer types, the above results indicate that the incentive to reveal
information is quite low. Indeed, analyzing the pricing decision and the
signaling game (where customers must purchase product i or receive their
reservation utility of zero, and the FI can say whether product i is a good or
bad match) in the appendix we prove:
Proposition 1 A monopoly FI A (B) reveals no information (always rec-
o m m e n d sp r o d u c tA( B ) )a n ds e t sp r i c epA = r + q∆ (pB = r +( 1− q)∆).
For any price above r, the monopoly can’t reveal any information because
it would get stuck with only the customers of its type and prefer to deviate
and grab all of the customers. Given an investment in information provision,
the rents from selling to all of the market outweigh the reputation cost of
lying to a fraction of the customers (using assumption A1). This logic,
which is present as well in comparing the no information case to the full
information case, disappears when competition is introduced, as we will see
in the following sections. The advantage of having a captive audience that
has high valuations for the product drives this reversal.
3.2 Monopoly Pricing of a one-stop bank
The key diﬀerence between a specialized and a one-stop FI is that the latter
will ﬁnd it much easier to overcome the conﬂict of interest problem in the
provision of information. This can be explained by the fact that provision of
information need no longer result in any loss of clientele. This an important
potential beneﬁt of one-stop banks emphasized by bankers who deal with the
marketing of ﬁnancial products.
We now assume that one FI, which we will call FI 1, oﬀers both ﬁnancial
products A and B without competition at prices p1A and p1B,a n dr e f e rt o
this FI as a one-stop bank. Market power gives the FI leverage in pricing, but
8it cannot fully extract consumer rents if it is unable to provide information.
In this case, the best that the FI can do would be to set p1A equal to r+q∆,
and set p1B so that no one will purchase it (i.e. p1B >r+( 1− q)∆). The
one-stop bank then does not even sell both products, it sells the one for
which customers have a higher ex-ante valuation. Its actions emulate those
of a specialized bank.
In the case where the one-stop bank can provide information, product
B is sold to type B customers. The one-stop bank is able to segment the
market and extract full rents by providing full information.
Proposition 2 A monopoly one-stop bank fully reveals information, cus-
tomers purchase the product which matches their type, and prices are p1A =
p1B = R.
Note that when ρ>0, the one-stop bank can credibly reveal the infor-
mation it has about customer types. The reason is simply that by making
the prices of the two products close to each other, it eliminates the incentive
to misdirect the customer, and saves the reputation cost ρ when it tells the
truth. By setting the prices equal to R, the bank can tell the truth and
simultaneously extract all rents. When ρ =0the bank is indiﬀerent and one
equilibrium is for the bank to tell the truth.
This section highlights a simple but important economic principle, which
is that monopoly one-stop banks are better able to overcome the conﬂict of
interest problem in advising their clients on what product is best for them.
We shall now see however that when there is competition among banks this
general principle is no longer valid. Put simply, competition induces infor-
mation revelation whether it is between specialized banks or with a one-stop
bank.4
4We take the reputation cost per customer incurred when lying as exogenously ﬁxed
at ρ. It might be argued, however, that the reputation cost varies with market structure.
To the extent that monopolists extract larger mark-ups they may be more wary of losing
future customers. On the other hand, monopolists face a captive demand, which makes
them less concerned about losing business to competitiors. How these countervailing eﬀects
play out requires a more detailed analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
94 Information Provision and Competition among
Specialized FIs
This section is devoted to studying under what conditions a specialized FI has
incentives to provide information to its customers in equilibrium. This will
be contrasted with the provision of information by one-stop banks considered
in the next section. Intuitively, specialized FIs have a conﬂict of interest in
advising their prospective customers to bank at the competitor FI. At the
same time, truthful revelation increases the customers’ valuations for their
own products. These diverging incentives determine the equilibrium amount
of revelation. Before analyzing the FIs’ incentives for truthful revelation it is
helpful to ﬁrst consider the extreme situations of no information revelation
and full information disclosure.
4.1 Competition with no information
In the absence of any additional information, a customer buys product A
provided by the FI specialized in A services if and only if:
qR+( 1− q)r − pA ≥ qr +( 1− q)R − pB (1)
That is, if and only if
(2q − 1)∆ ≥ pA − pB
Thus, FI A will set a price5 pA =( 2 q −1)∆,f o r c i n gF IB to zero proﬁts.
For this price level the customer’s participation constraint is satisﬁed:
qR+( 1− q)r − (2q − 1)∆ = R − q∆ ≥ 0
As is intuitive, the larger the product diﬀerentiation ∆ and the larger the
probability that customers are of type A, the larger the price diﬀerence and
A s proﬁts. The closer ∆ is to zero and/or the closer q is to 1
2 t h em o r ei n t e n s e
the competition between FIs and the larger is the customer’s surplus, as the
two products become close substitutes from the perspective of uninformed
5This is for the case where FI A is the price leader. If FI B is the price leader, there
are multiple equilibria which consist of pB and pA = min[(2q − 1)∆ + pB,qR+( 1− q)r]
since FI B always makes zero proﬁts. Note that the equilibrium when FI A is the price
leader is included in this set.
10customers. Absent any information, FI B makes zero proﬁts due to the
ex-ante preference of customers for product A.
4.2 Competition under full information
Suppose that a customer knows her true type. All A-customers are then
l i k e l yt ob a n ka tF IA,a n da l lB-customers to bank at FI B. In other words,
each FI is then likely to have a captive clientele. This will have the eﬀect of
dampening price competition as each FI will be reluctant to cut prices low
enough to attract mismatched customers. It is not surprising then that the
following proposition should hold:
Proposition 3 Under full information, if FI A is the price leader, the equi-
librium prices are pA =
2−q
q ∆ and pB = 2
q∆, and equilibrium proﬁts are
πA =( 2− q)∆ and πB =
2(1−q)
q ∆.
This is straightforward and is proven in the appendix. Note that if FI B
becomes the price leader, the results are symmetric (switch A for B and q
for 1 − q).
The comparison with the absence of information case points out the mit-
igating eﬀect of quality uncertainty (Bester (1998)). Information production
increases eﬃciency (total surplus here is R, compared to qR+(1−q)r in the
no information case), but it also decreases competition through higher prices
as every ﬁrm now has market power over its own type. We will now show
however that this monopoly power is impaired by the FIs’ conﬂict of interest
problem in advising its customers.
4.3 Competition under credible information produc-
tion
When FIs must be induced to give honest advice they are in a weaker position
to exploit their local monopoly power. The reason is simply that if they
charge high prices and also recommend their expensive product to prospective
customers, this recommendation is not credible.
Once FIs have set their prices and customers have made their decision on
which FI to approach, an FI that has invested in information provision can
ascertain the true types of customers. We analyze the incentives of the FI to
provide information as a signaling game where the FI’s type is its information
about the customer.
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Figure 1: The Information Revelation Game
4.3.1 The information revelation game for a specialized FI
An FI’s strategy can be summarized by two variables: the probability α
that a type A customer is correctly advised to choose product A and the
probability β that a type B customer is wrongly advised to take product A.
Having received a recommendation  A to purchase product A,o r B to
purchase product B, a customer’s strategy can be described, symmetrically,
by the probability a o ff o l l o w i n gt h ea d v i c et ot a k ep r o d u c tA,a n dt h e
probability b of following the advice to take product B.F i g u r e1s h o w st h e
basic information revelation game structure.
We begin by characterizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in the information
revelation game of FI A, taking as given the prices quoted by the FIs and
the customers’ decisions as to which FI to approach. In a second step we
shall move back in the game tree and solve for the equilibrium prices and
customer decisions on where to bank in the full game. As is standard for
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, each agent chooses optimally its strategy
given the equilibrium (or out-of-equilibrium) beliefs and the other agents’
strategies. For out-of-equilibrium beliefs we rely on the Cho-Kreps (1987)
12intuitive criterion to pin down beliefs.
In order to compute the solution of the information revelation game, we
will consider the optimal strategy of the diﬀerent agents. FIs maximize their
proﬁts net of the reputation cost of lying. So when FI A observes a type A
customer the necessary condition for FI A to truthfully reveal A s type is:
apA ≥ (1 − b)(pA − ρ),
or equivalently, using the notation ≡ to mean “deﬁned by”:
∆πA(A) ≡ (a + b − 1)pA +( 1− b)ρ ≥ 0 (2)
Symmetrically, when FI A observes a type B customer, the necessary
condition for FI A to truthfully reveal B’s type is:
∆πA(B) ≡ −(a + b − 1)pA + aρ ≥ 0 (3)
Since in general FIs may play mixed strategies, customers must use equi-
librium updated beliefs when they receive a recommendation in order to
compute their optimal strategies. We restricted customers’ strategies, on the
other hand, to pure strategies with assumption A2.
Customers react to an FI’s announcement by choosing a product. Denote
by  X the announcement a customer receives and by p(i |  X) the updated
belief that an agent receiving the announcement  X is of type i (where i =
A,B and  X =  A,  B). The necessary condition for a customer at FI A
receiving a recommendation  A to buy product A is then:
p(A |  A)R +( 1− p(A |  A))r − pA ≥ p(A |  A)r +( 1− p(A |  A))R − pB
This can be simpliﬁed to
(2p(A |  A) − 1)∆ ≥ pA − pB
or equivalently,
∆UA(  A) ≡ (2p(A |  A) − 1)∆ − pA + pB ≥ 0 (4)
Correspondingly, the necessary conditions for a for a customer at FI A
receiving a recommendation  B to buy product B is:
13∆UA( B)=( 2 p(B |  B) − 1)∆ − pB + pA ≥ 0 (5)
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium will then be deﬁned by a set of poste-
rior beliefs p(i |  X), which are consistent with the optimal behavior of FIs
and customers as inferred from the signs of ∆πA(A), ∆πA(B), ∆UA(  A) and
∆UA( B).
The following lemma provides a characterization of the FIs’ information
revelation in equilibrium. It is the central result of our analysis.
Lemma 4 Under assumptions A1 and A2, equilibria in the information rev-
elation game of FI A are as follows:
1. If pA <p B − ∆,t h e nF IA truthfully reveals the customer’s type and
all customers purchase A.
2. If pB − ∆ <p A <ρ ,t h e nF IA truthfully reveals the customer’st y p e
and the customers purchase the good that matches their type.
3. If max[ρ,pB −∆] <p A <p B +(2q−1)∆,t h e nF IA always announces
ˆ A and customers purchase A.
4. If pA >p B +( 2 q − 1)∆, then either
(a) the FI A mixes its messages for both types of customers (α,β ∈
(0,1) × (0,1)), or mixes its messages for one type of customer
(α =1 ,β∈ (0,1)) or (β =1 ,α∈ (0,1)) within a range deﬁned by
pA >p B+∆max[2
αq
αq + β(1 − q)
−1,1−2
(1 − β)(1 − q)
(1 − α)q +( 1− β)(1 − q)
]
or
(b) systematically announces  A provided the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
P(B |  B) satisfy
pA >p B +∆m a x

2q − 1,1 − 2P(B |  B)

or
14(c) systematically announces  B provided the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
P(A |  A) satisfy
pA >p B +∆m a x

2q − 1,2P(A |  A) − 1

and all customers purchase B.
5. If pA >p B +∆ , then all customers purchase B and any revelation
strategy (including full revelation) is an equilibrium
T h ep r oo fo ft h el e m m ai si nt h ea p pe n d i x .W ec a nn o wu s ei tt od e t e r m i n e
for a given set of parameters ρ, q, ∆,a n dp r i c e spA and pB what information
revelation regime a ﬁrm is in. In one interval, pB +( 2 q − 1)∆ <p A <ρ ,
there exist multiple equilibria: a fully revealing one where customers follow
FI A’s advice and many partially revealing equilibria in which all customers
purchase product B. However, given that pA <ρ , any partially revealing
strategy by a sender type of FI A (where sender types are “Knows customer
is type A” and “Knows customer is type B”) is weakly dominated by a
strategy of full revelation. Hence the partially revealing strategy will not
survive any tiny trembles in the customer’s decision, and we ignore it6.S i n c e
FI A and FI B are symmetric except for consumer’s ex-ante preferences, we
can replicate Lemma 2 for FI B by substituting in (1 − q) for q.
In Figure 2 we ﬁx pB and display FI A’s information revelation regime
for any possible pA that it may set. We ﬁnd that when FI A has very low
prices, it has the incentives to reveal information truthfully and can capture
the whole market. In contrast, when FI A has high prices, it will not get any
customers, and will be willing to say anything. For a middle range of prices,
FI A may credibly reveal information but only capture the customers who
are good matches, or it may reveal nothing and take advantage of its ex-ante
advantage in terms of consumers’ preferences.
A tt h i sp o i n tw eh a v es o l v e dt h es u b g a m eo fi n f o r m a t i o nr e v e l a t i o ng i v e n
ﬁxed prices. We can now determine how each ﬁrm sets its prices and then
determine which ﬁrm invests in information provision in equilibrium.
6More formally, type “Knows customer is type A” gets a payoﬀ of either 0 or pA by
announcing ˆ A a n dg e t sap a y o ﬀo fe i t h e r0 or pA −ρ by announcing ˆ B . In the interval of
parameters, pA <ρ , so weak dominance is clear. Similarly type “Knows customer is type
B” gets a payoﬀ of either 0 or pA by announcing ˆ B and gets a payoﬀ of either 0 or pA −ρ
by announcing ˆ A . Therefore, any partially revealing equilibrium in this interval does not
survive the test of trembling hand perfection.
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Figure 2: The Information Revelation Regimes of FI A (holding pB ﬁxed)
4.3.2 The price competition game between specialized FIs
The previous lemma characterizes a number of scenarios where there is either
partial or no credible information disclosure given pA and pB.T h i sl i m i t e d
information disclosure outcome is what one would expect to see in light of our
observation that monopoly specialized FIs are never able to credibly convey
information. We now show however that price competition among specialized
FIs is likely to bring about equilibrium outcomes where each FI can credibly
convey information. To see this, suppose for the sake of argument that
specialized FIs are never able to credibly convey information. Then, as we
showed earlier, Bertrand competition under no information will result in an
equilibrium outcome where πB =0and πA =( 2 q−1)∆. But note that bank
B will then have a strict incentive to truthfully reveal the customer’st y p e ,a s
long as ρ>0.T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tb a n kBw o u l db ea b l et or a i s ei t s
price pB up to ρ, credibly convey information to its well matched customers
and make higher proﬁts.
In our formal analysis of the price competition stage game we begin by
16assuming that ﬁrm A is the price leader and ﬁrm B is the price follower. This
means that FI A essentially deﬁnes the choice set of possible information
revelation regimes (with their accompanying proﬁts) and FI B decides where
to locate in the choice set. Clearly this gives FI B an advantage it never
had when customers did not have access to information - it can force some
information to be revealed credibly and increase its sales.
Our simple observations above lead us to conclude:
Proposition 5 1) When A invests in information and B does not, there are
two possible equilibria. If ρ>(2q − 1)∆, equilibrium is pA = ρ,pB = ρ +∆ ,
all customers approach FI A and are revealed their true types. Customers
then purchase at the bank that matches their type, so proﬁts are πA = qρ,
πB =( 1− q)(ρ +∆ ) .I fρ<(2q − 1)∆, equilibrium is pA =( 2 q − 1)∆,p B
undetermined, all customers approach FI A, are all told they are type A,a n d
purchase at FI A. Proﬁts are πA =( 2 q − 1)∆, πB =0 .
2) When B invests in information and A does not, the equilibrium is
pA = min[(1 −q)ρ+∆ ,ρ+(2q −1)∆],p B = ρ, all customers approach FI B
and are revealed their true types. Customers follow the advice of FI B and
proﬁts are πA = qpA, πB =( 1− q)ρ.
3) When both A and B invest in information, the equilibrium is pA =
min[(1−q)ρ+∆,ρ+(2q−1)∆],p B = ρ, just as in the case of only B investing
in information. All customers approach FI B or are indiﬀerent between
approaching FI A or FI B and are revealed their true types. Customers follow
the advice of the bank they approach and proﬁts are πA = qpA, πB =( 1−q)ρ.
T h ep r o o fi si nt h ea p p e n d i x .
Thus, for almost all of the cases the types of customers are completely
revealed, and prices are such that they purchase the product which matches
their type. This results from the following intuition: FI B can almost always
set its price low enough so that FI A will have zero proﬁts. Therefore FI A
must set its price such that FI B will ﬁnd it more attractive not to undercut.
This must be a regime where both FI A and FI B make positive proﬁts.
T h eo n l ya r e aw h e r eb o t hﬁrms may proﬁt is where they can commit to
fully revealing types and customers ﬁnd the price diﬀerential small enough
to purchase the product which matches their type. The only case in which
information is not revealed occurs when ex-ante valuations are so biased
towards product A ((2q−1)∆ >ρ )t h a tF IA can extract higher rents by not
revealing information. The role of reputation is quite critical here - in order
17to commit to full revelation, the payoﬀ from deviating must be non-positive,
hence the size of ρ strictly limits the payoﬀ for the ﬁrm that is providing
information. Therefore, information revelation becomes a survival strategy
to relax price competition by increasing product diﬀerentiation. However,
unlike the conclusion reached by Bester (1998)h e r et h ei n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t s
for credible information provision limit the extent to which FIs can exploit
their monopoly power.
4.3.3 The information provision game between specialized FIs
Wea r en o wi nap o s i t i o nt or o l lb a c kt ot h eﬁrst stage of the game, where
FIs make their investment in information-provision decisions. Weh a v es of a r
taken the information structure as given (which bank provides information).
Now we let banks choose whether they want to invest in an information pro-
vision technology (hire analysts, build IT systems, etc.) at some ﬁxed cost
f>0. To the extent that information provision is a public good and is costly
t op r o d u c ei ti se ﬃ c i e n tf o ra tm o s to n eb a n kt op r o v i d et h i si n f o r m a t i o n .
Wen o ws h o wt h a ti ne quilibrium no more than one bank will provide infor-
mation, and that it is the disadvantaged bank that is likely to provide that
information. That is, that bank B is most likely to provide that information.
This is not entirely surprising given that the value of information is highest
for that bank. Putting together this observation with our previous ﬁnding
that the disadvantaged bank is the one with the strongest incentives towards
truthful revelation of information we are able to obtain the remarkable result
that, as long as investment in information provision is proﬁtable in equi-
librium, there always will be full information disclosure under competition
between specialized FIs.
The basic logic leading us to this conclusion runs as follows. Under no
information provision, the unique equilibrium in proﬁts is such that πB =0
and πA =( 2 q−1)∆.I fb a n kA were to provide information and communicate
it credibly to its customers it would have to set its margin pA no higher than
ρ.T h u s , b a n k A’sp r o ﬁts under full credible information revelation would
be no more than qρ − f. Therefore bank A would not want to provide
information whenever
(2q − 1)∆ ≥ qρ− f.
Our earlier analysis also leads us to conclude that when (2q − 1)∆ ≥ ρ and
only bank A is in a position to provide information then there will be no
credible information disclosure in equilibrium. This appears to set a limit to
18the amount of credible information disclosure we should expect to see in an
equilibrium with competition among specialized FIs.
However, since bank B has, if anything, even more to gain from providing
information there will be full credible information disclosure in equilibrium
for a much larger set of parameter values.
Proposition 6 There is full credible information disclosure in equilibrium
when ρ ≥
f
1−q. Otherwise, no information will be disclosed.
Proof. T h ed e c i s i o nt oi n v e s ti sat w ob yt w og a m es u m m a r i z e db yt h e
following matrix7:
qpA-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
qpA-f, (1-q)ρ -f qρ -f, (1-q)(ρ + ∆ ) Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
qpA, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ , 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
qpA-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
qpA-f, (1-q)ρ -f qρ -f, (1-q)(ρ + ∆ ) Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
qpA, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ , 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
Figure 3: Matrix for Competition among Specialized Banks (A is the price
leader)




q ), there is a unique equilibrium: FI
B provides information and FI A does not. All customers approach FI B
ﬁrst, are revealed their true type, and purchase the product meant for them.
When ρ is large (ρ>
(2q−1)∆+f
q ), not providing information is no longer a
dominant strategy for FI A,a n dt h e r ea r et w oe quilibria: one where only FI A
provides and one where only FI B provides. There can be no mixed strategy
equilibrium here due to assumption A2, which makes it impossible to be
indiﬀerent. Lastly, when ρ is tiny or zero (ρ<
f
1−q), the unique equilibrium
is for both ﬁrms to not provide information.
7For presentation purposes, we place a strict upper bound such that f<(1−q)(2q−1)∆.
This incorporates the case where the ﬁxed cost is close to zero.
19Reputation proves quite important since ﬁrms can commit to full revela-
tion where they share the market by setting a price just below the reputation
cost. FI B has a strong incentive to provide information since the information
gives it the market power it was lacking when all customers ex-ante preferred
product A.F IA can free ride on this information provision as its own invest-
ment in information would not change its returns. In fact, for intermediate
values of ρ,F IA has a dominant strategy not to provide information since if
FI B doesn’t provide information FI A can still enjoy its inherent advantage.
Once ρ gets larger, FI A can possibly credibly provide information, because
it receives a high enough rent to justify its provision. Lastly, notice that as ρ
approaches zero, all of FI B’s rents disappear in every scenario. The lack of
a reputation cost eliminates the ability to credibly reveal information, which
FI B used to achieve positive proﬁts.
Total welfare is actually maximized in the equilibria where full informa-
tion is provided, since each customer is able to realize more utility due to
the match. When information is not provided, as is the case when ρ is tiny,
matching eﬃciency is not realized and welfare decreases.
When FI B is the price leader, the qualitative results do not change
substantially. The payoﬀs are given by the following matrix (the proof is in
the appendix):
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ +pB
I,NI -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f qρ -f, (1-q)(ρ -(2q-1)∆ ) Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
q(ρ + ∆ ), (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ +pB
NI,NI, 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ +pB
I,NI -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f qρ -f, (1-q)(ρ -(2q-1)∆ ) Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
q(ρ + ∆ ), (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ +pB
NI,NI, 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
Figure 4: Ma t r i xf o rC o m p e t i t i o na m o n gSpecialized Banks (B is the price
leader)
20A few things are interesting to observe here. First, the (NoI n f o r m a t i o n ,
No Information) and the (Information if ρ<(2q−1)∆, No Information) cases
are not determined, since for any pB announced by FI B,F IA will be able to
grab all of the customers and leave FI B with zero proﬁts. For the purposes





Second, the (Information, Information) case is more complex here, since FI
A’s advantage in ex-ante preferences allows it to free ride on FI B in the
sense that FI A may keep its prices high and allow FI B to inform customers
of their types. Indeed, the equilibrium has FI A partially revealing, FI B
fully revealing, all customers approaching FI B ﬁrst but then following FI
B’sa d v i c e .
Third, it is clear from the (Information, Information) case, and the (No
Information, Information) case that FI A is able to exploit its role as a price
follower to its advantage in achieving higher payoﬀs.
We ﬁnd that for reputation cost that is tiny or equal to zero (ρ<
f
1−q),
the unique equilibrium is that neither ﬁrm provides information. For larger
reputation costs, the unique equilibrium is that only FI B provides informa-
tion. All customers go to FI B, are revealed their true type, and purchase
the product which matches their type.
5 Competition between a one-stop bank and
as p e c i a l i z e dF I
Suppose that a one-stop bank, FI 1, competes against another FI that re-
mains specialized and oﬀers product B. Since both banks have product B,
competition is much tougher in a certain sense. Wew i l lﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ec a s e
where FI 1 is the price leader.
When neither FI provides any information, the equilibrium is the same
as in the case of competition between specialized FIs. This is also true under
full information (i.e. where customers know their type). Hence the one-stop
bank does not proﬁt strategically or directly from having product B.
In the case of competition when information revelation is endogenous,
FI 1 will always be undercut on product B by FI B. This implies we can
use Lemma 4 since the elements of the signaling game remain the same.
However, FI 1 can use the price p1B strategically to limit FI B from imposing
an information revelation regime that is not advantageous to FI 1.T h i s i s
21the main diﬀerence between this case and the one in which FI A and FI B
compete with FI A as the price leader. Therefore, proﬁts here will be at least
a sl a r g ea si nt h a tc a s e ,i fn o tl a r g e r .
This logic changes the solution somewhat anytime when FI B provides
information. Remember that in this situation, we found pA = min[(1−q)ρ+
∆,ρ+(2q − 1)∆]. This represented the fact that FI A wanted to make sure
FI B w o u l dh a v eh i g h e rp r o ﬁts by pricing in a region which would commit
FI B to full revelation (with customers following its advice) as well as make
sure that FI B could not raise its price and enter a non-revealing regime.
The issue of keeping FI B from raising its price is one that the one-stop
bank can solve easily by setting its price for product B appropriately and
hence creating an upper bound for pB. Therefore p1A =( 1− q)ρ +∆and
π1 = q((1 − q)ρ +∆ ) .
The information provision game remains similar for smaller values of ρ.
When ρ is tiny, no one provides information. When ρ is small, only FI B
provides information. When ρ is large, the result is undetermined. This is
due to the fact that the payoﬀ for FI B depends on what price p1B FI 1 sets,
and FI 1 is indiﬀerent over a range of prices (p1B <ρ+∆ ) since it will not
sell any of product B.
In contrast, when FI B is the price leader, results change in the informa-
tion revelation game from when there were just two specialized banks com-
peting. Let’s assume FI B chooses some price pB. Hence in the environment
where no information is provided, the equilibrium is p1A =( 2 q − 1)∆ + pB
and p1B >p B, with all proﬁts going to the one-stop bank and all consumers
purchasing product A. When customers know their type ex-ante, the one
stop bank gets all of the proﬁts and consumers purchase the product which
matches their type8.
When information provision is endogenous, the signaling game changes
signiﬁcantly from section 4. First of all, the game for FI 1 can look like the
game where a one-stop bank has no competition if it undercuts FI B and sets
p1B = pB − δ (where δ is small). In this case we can apply the results from
the signaling game of Proposition 2 to ﬁnd the solution. It is straightforward
to show that if FI 1 undercuts FI B, it will set p1A = p1B+ρ = pB−δ+ρ and
achieve proﬁts of pB−δ+qρwhen ρ>(2q−1)∆, or set p1A = p1B+(2q−1)∆ =
pB −δ+(2q−1)∆ and achieve proﬁts of pB −δ+(2q−1)∆−(1−q)ρ when
8Restricting attention to pure strategies, if pB >r , p1A = R and p1B = pB − δ (where
δ is small), while if pB <r , p1A =∆+pB − δ and p1B = pB − δ.
22ρ<(2q − 1)∆.T h i s g i v e s F I 1 weakly larger proﬁts than a specialized FI
A gets when FI B does not provide information (compare with Figure 4).
When FI B provides information, however, it may choose pB strategically
to avoid undercutting behavior and make positive proﬁts. Basically, it can
choose p∗
B such that it satisﬁes the incentive constraint of FI 1 to prefer not to
undercut on product B. Using this logic and the solution from the case of FI
A vs. FI B9,t h i si m p l i e sp∗
B =m i n [ ρ,
q
1−q(∆−ρ)] if FI 1 provides information
and ρ>(2q − 1)∆,a n dp∗
B = ρ otherwise. This yields the following payoﬀ
matrix:
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ +pB
I,NI -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
q(pB
*+ ∆ )-f, (1-q) pB
*-f pB
I,NI +qρ -f, 0 Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
q(ρ + ∆ ), (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ +pB
NI,NI, 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
q(ρ + ∆ )-f, (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ -( 1 - q ) ρ +pB
I,NI -f, 0 Info if ρ <(2q-1) ∆
q(pB
*+ ∆ )-f, (1-q) pB
*-f pB
I,NI +qρ -f, 0 Info if ρ >(2q-1)∆
q(ρ + ∆ ), (1-q)ρ -f (2q-1)∆ +pB
NI,NI, 0 No Info FI A
Info No Info
FI B
Figure 5: Matrix for Competition between a One-Stop and a Specialized FI
(B is the price leader)
Despite the diﬀerences in the potential strategies, we ﬁnd equilibria that
are similar to our previous ones10.F o rρ<
f
1−q , the unique solution is that
neither FI provides information. For larger values of ρ, their may either be
one equilibrium, where only FI B provides information, or two equilibria,
each where only one FI provides information11.
9Note that in this case, one part of the no-undercutting constraint is that ρ<p 1A −
(2q − 1)∆. This implies (1 − (1 − q)(2q − 1))∆ >ρ , which we assume to be true here.





11Speciﬁcally, if ρ<q ∆, there is only one equilibrium in the high range (FI B pro-
vides information). If ρ>q ∆,f o r
f
1−q <ρ<ˆ ρ, there is only one equilibrium (FI B
236 Switching Costs
Changing the structure of switching costs within our model would change
results dramatically. Imagine that instead of the ability to switch between
banks once for free, it was impossible to switch at all. This creates more
market power and highlights a diﬀerent role for information revelation. First,
consider our basic model of competition between FI A and FI B. With high
switching costs, there is no room for information provision:
Proposition 7 With high switching costs and FI A as the price leader, nei-
ther ﬁrm invests in information provision and πA =( 2 q − 1)∆ and πB =0 .
The equilibrium is the same as was described in the section on competi-
tion under no information. The reason is quite simple. The switching costs
eliminate the eﬀect of ﬁrm i’sp r i c e so nﬁrm j’s signaling regime. Each ﬁrm
thus acts like a monopoly specialized bank in signaling. Since the highest
utility that can be oﬀered to customers when they are deciding which ﬁrm to
approach is the same as their uninformed ex-ante utility, there is no incentive
for either ﬁrm to invest in information provision. Switching costs thus lead
to a reduction in total surplus, as the lack of information causes matching
ineﬃciency.
Ne x t ,c o n s i d e rc o m p e t i t i o nb e t w e e nao n e - s t o pb a n k( d e n o t e db e f o r ea s
FI 1)a n dF IB.F IB will ﬁnd it useless to provide information for the same
reason as above, i.e. even with information it can’t increase the expected
valuations of customers. This ruins its potential to strategically force FI 1
into softer competition. FI 1, on the other hand, has an incentive to reveal
information and raise customers’ ex-ante valuations for banking there. It can
accomplish this credibly by setting p1A = p1B (see Proposition 2)a si nt h e
case when it is a monopoly.
Proposition 8 With high switching costs and the one-stop bank as the price
leader, the one-stop bank fully reveals its information and πA = q∆ and
πB =0 .
The proﬁt sa r ed e r i v e df r o mt h ef a c tt h a te x p e c t e dv a l u a t i o n so fa p -
proaching the one-stop bank for customers is R, while for approaching FI B
provides information), while for ρ>ˆ ρ there are two equilibria (one where only FI B
provides information, and one where only FI A provides information). Here we deﬁne





24it is qr +( 1− q)R. Here switching costs allow for matching eﬃciency for all
levels of reputation costs.
7 Market Structure
We have found that in all equilibria when the reputation cost is signiﬁcant,
competition between ﬁrms creates the incentives not only to provide infor-
mation, but to provide full information to all customers.
For very small costs of reputation, no information is provided when there
is competition. Ho w e v e r ,w h e nt h em a r k e ti sd o m i n a t e db yao n e - s t o pb a n k ,
as long as the reputation cost is positive the one-stop bank can credibly pro-
vide information and extract the customers’ rents. Hence, the gains from
reducing competition/increasing market power are much larger when repu-
tation costs are low. As we saw in the previous section, switching costs can
implicitly create market power.
Adding a product (going from a specialized bank to a one-stop bank)
while competing can yield added proﬁts in certain circumstances. Clearly, it
softens competition if the market is already homogeneous (such as competi-
tion between two FI Bs). However, another product can also be used as a
strategic buﬀer, keeping the other ﬁrm from entering a disadvantageous in-
formation revelation regime and therefore allowing more proﬁts (we see this
when the reputation cost is low (ρ<
2(1−q)
q ∆) in competition between FI 1
and FI B).
The conditions under which one-stop banks can prosper are quite inter-
esting given current trends. The abolition of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999
p a v e dt h ew a yi nt h eUnited States for the creation of one-stop banks. In
Europe, such banks, called “universal banks” have existed for many years,
but are now undergoing a shake-up as mergers across borders are seen as
necessary for survival12. The traditional explanation for the trend towards
consolidation are the economies of scope realized by selling multiple ﬁnan-
cial products from the same outlet. However, by analyzing these banks from
an information provision perspective, we open up a richer understanding of
market structure.
From a welfare perspective, when customers are ex-ante fully informed,
welfare is maximized at the expense of consumer surplus. When customers
12This is echoed in Banking Surveys by The Economist (April 4, 2002) and The Financial
Times (May 24, 2002).
25are uninformed, welfare is low as all B t y p e sp u r c h a s ep r o d u c tA. Endo-
genizing information revelation comes close to maximizing welfare (within
the cost f of information provision) at the expense of lower ﬁrm proﬁts due
to competitive pressure. Market power due to conglomeration restores full
extraction of the maximized surplus by the FI when information revelation
is possible13.
While market power extracts full rents, we ﬁnd that in the absence of
market power, ex-ante full information yields the largest proﬁts. The FIs
must take losses in order to be able to commit to credible revelation of
information. Although we do not model heterogeneity among clients, it is
likely that larger and wealthier customers have more information about (or
more advisers to counsel them on) their speciﬁc needs. Interestingly, by
b e i n gb e t t e ri n f o r m e d ,t h e yc o u l db ef o r c e dt op a ym o r ei nt e r m so fh i g h e r
prices per product. These types of clients may be large money-makers for
banks in terms of not only volume, but per-unit return. Indeed, there is a
large focus in the banking industry on catering to these higher end customers
(‘private banking’). We elaborate on the eﬀect that we describe here in the
next section.
8 Unobservable Investments in Information
Provision
In the previous sections it was assumed that customers were able to check
that the bank had made the necessary investment to provide them with re-
liable information. Nevertheless, these investments may be diﬃcult and/or
undesirable for banks to demonstrate. If so, the banks’ investments in in-
formation provision are subject to moral hazard. Banks will invest in infor-
mation provision if and only if this leads to higher proﬁts, while customers
will only infer the investment has been made when the bank proﬁts from the
investment. Asac o n s e quence, the nature of the equilibrium is modiﬁed.
A natural question that then arises is what impact the observability of
information provision services has on the industry. This question becomes
13How realistic is the notion of market power among ﬁnancial intermediaries? “A hand-
ful of familiar names - Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch -
dominates these businesses, either because it takes a huge investment to build them, or
because only top names are trusted. Yet only Citigroup oﬀers corporate and institutional
clients the full range of services...” (The Economist, April 4th, 2002)
26even more salient when we discuss the nature of Independent Financial Advi-
sors, advisors separate from banks who may or may not be providing “good”
information.
8.1 Unobservable investments with competition between
specialized FIs
T h eb a s i ct i m i n go ft h eg a m er e m a i n st h es a m e ,e x c e p tt h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n t
in stage 1 in information provision is observable only to the ﬁrm making the
investment. The values of all parameters of the game are common knowl-
edge among all participants. For brevity, we will only focus on the case of
competition between specialized banks where FI A is the price leader.
FI B will invest in information when it is better than the outside option
and has no proﬁtable deviation. A proﬁtable deviation would be not to invest
in information, holding the subsequent price and customers’ beliefs that FI B
invested in information ﬁxed. In this case, customers believing that FI B has
information will approach FI B to solicit advice, and all will be recommended
to purchase product B (this is a best response for FI B). We summarize this
l o g i ci na ni n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t :
(1 − q)pB − f>p B − qρ (6)
This implies an upper bound for pB of ρ −
f
q. No t i c et h a tt h i si ss t r i c t l y
lower than the upper bound for credible information provision when invest-
ment in information is observable (ρ).
Adding the participation constraint:
(1 − q)pB − f>0
Setting pB equal to its upper bound ρ −
f
q, and plugging the value into




This condition on the reputation cost is strong. It means there is an




(1−q)q), where information would be provided
when investment is observable but would not under unobservable investment.
Thus, the unobservability, perhaps unsurprisingly, decreases total surplus.
27Similarly, we look for equilibria where FI A is willing to invest in informa-
tion. We can derive an incentive constraint for FI A by substituting 1−q for
q in equation 6 and set FI A’sp r i c ee qu a lt ot h em a x i m u mo ft h i si n t e r v a l ,
ρ−
f
1−q. The participation constraint for FI A is not symmetric, though, since
FI A’s payoﬀ from not investing in information and all customers knowing
this would be positive: (2q−1)∆. Thus the participation constraint reduces
to:






Like the case of observable investment, an equilibrium that has FI A
investing only occurs when the reputation cost is larger, because then the
payoﬀ is substantial enough. It is also clear that the cutoﬀ for which there
are equilibrium where either FI A or FI B provide information is higher here





Ane quilibrium where no ﬁr mi n v e s t si ni n f o r m a t i o ni sa l w a y sa ne quilib-
rium, for all parameter values. This is clear when we look at the incentive
constraint. If the FI does not invest in information and the customers know
this, it gets some non-negative payoﬀ ˜ π. By deviating and investing in in-
formation, given customers believe it will not provide any, its payoﬀ will be
˜ π − f. Wec a l lt h i st h e“Cassandra eﬀect”, as the FI may have valuable
information to reveal, but no customer is listening.
Therefore, the set of equilibria resembles that of observable information
with two main diﬀerences. First, there is a larger interval for which no infor-
mation provision is the unique equilibrium. Second, due to the “Cassandra
eﬀect”, no information provision is always an equilibrium.
8.2 Independent Financial Advisors
A discussion about potential conﬂicts of interest across the ﬁnancial sector
has been opened recently, in part due the large scandal recently settled by the
SECa n d1 0 prominent Wall Street ﬁrms for $1.4 billion. Separating ﬁnancial
advisors from the products they sell is a remedy that seems obvious14 .T h i s
can come in two forms: creating a so-called “Chinese wall” between the
analytical and sales areas of each bank, or allowing the analytical areas to
14Indeed, it is one of the immediate remedies called for by the SEC in the aforementioned
case.
28be spun oﬀ into independent ﬁnancial advisors (IFAs). Interestingly enough,
in the framework of our model, this separation can be strictly beneﬁcial to
the ﬁnancial intermediaries. However, we ﬁnd that it is not always clear that
IFAs will actually provide more information than the banks themselves. Asi n
the previous section, we will focus on competition between two diﬀerentiated
specialized banks.
T h ef a c tt h a tﬁnancial intermediaries will beneﬁt from credible informa-
tion provision by IFAsi se a s yt os e e .Suppose that the ﬁnancial advisor has
the correct incentives to tell the truth15. Then customers have perfect infor-
mation before they approach the banks. As shown earlier in the paper, when
competition exists between specialized banks, proﬁts are larger under full
i n f o r m a t i o nt h a nw h e ni n f o r m a t i o nm u s tb ep r o v i d e db yt h eb a n k sd i r e c t l y .
The banks charge lower prices when they must provide their own information
in order to credibly convey that information. In either case, total surplus is
the same, since all customers match perfectly, although consumer surplus is
clearly lower when ﬁnancial advice is delivered separately16. Therefore, the
competition policy implication is that, in order to protect customers interests,
a regulatory body should be cautious in advocating information provision by
IFAs.
The previous point argues that information provision by IFAsw i l lb e
beneﬁcial to FIs, but ignores the question of when the advisors will invest in
information provision. This is an issue of some importance, as the quality of
information provided by IFAs has been called into question. To look at this
issue, we suppose, as in the previous section, that investment in information
provision is unobservable. Since the payment to the advisor is the same
irrespective of the information the advisor provides, the incentive constraint
consists of comparing the costs of provision to the reputation cost. When
the ﬁxed cost of providing information is lower than the reputation cost of
lying, we have an equilibrium where information is provided. Notation-wise
15This can be easily accomplished if the independent ﬁnancial advisor charges a ﬁxed
amount for each customer, but suﬀers a positive reputation cost if she lies. Alternatively,
the advisor may be paid a ﬁxed amount irrespective of the number of customers by an FI,
but still suﬀer some reputation cost (such as ﬁring when customers complain), and the
results will go through.
16The beneﬁts of separation may not exist when a one-stop bank is competing against
as p e c i a l i zed bank. Moreover, when the specialized bank is a monopoly, we have seen
that it prefers customers to have no information. In this case, making ﬁnancial advice
independent would increase both total surplus (improve matching) and increase consumer
surplus (higher valuations and lower prices).




If ρI = ρ,w eﬁnd that the IFAs will provide information for the same
range of parameters as specialized banks with observable investments. The
IFAs will provide information in some cases when specialized banks with




(1−q)q). In this case,
IFAs help the specialized banks by revealing information where the banks
couldn’t, as well as allowing the banks to extract more rents. Asac a v e a t ,
however, it seems that in reality ρI would be less than ρ, due to the fact
there is much less at stake in a continuing relationship between an IFA and
a customer. This could reduce the provision of information by IFAs relative
to specialized banks. We also note that for all parameters there exists a
“Cassandra eﬀect” equilibrium where the IFA does not invest in information,
as in the previous section.
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper considers several aspects of market structure from the perspec-
tive of information provision to customers. By using this alternative road
we obtain a new perspective on conﬂicts of interest and consolidation in the
banking industry. We have found that competition foments information pro-
vision when reputation costs are present. The fact that a specialized FI has
incentives to provide information may surprise, since it will always lose to
its competitor the customers that are not of its type. Still, if we consider
as the starting point a situation where absent information a FI will get no
customers, providing information appears as an additional tool in the com-
petition for market share.
We have also found that the gains from increasing the number of ﬁnancial
products oﬀered and becoming a one-stop bank are largest when market
power can be exerted or customers have switching costs. Without these built
in customer bases, competition erodes the incentives to provide information.
Finally, ﬁnancial intermediaries may actually have an incentive to separate
advice from sales as it could allow them to diﬀerentiate their products and
receive higher margins.
30It would be interesting to extend this line of research in a dynamic di-
rection in order to quantify the potential reputation costs that banks may
incur. Another aspect that is worth further examination is allowing for het-
e r o g e n e i t yi nc u s t o m e r ’s knowledge of their types. With the advent of the
internet and private banking, it is probable that certain clients have better
information about which investments best match their needs. Our results in
this context suggest that if customers have more information, market power
and rents can actually increase, making this topic quite relevant to policy
discussions.
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11.1.1 Specialized Monopoly (Proposition 1)
We examine only the case of a monopoly specialized in product A (one spe-
cialized in B is a simple extension). If the customer does not purchase at FI
A, he receives a utility of zero and the bank makes zero proﬁts. FI A can
make two statements, “recommend product A” ( ˆ A)a n d“don’tr e c o m m e n d
product A” (∼ ˆ A). Lying when the customer purchases the product costs
the FI ρ per customer. No t et h a tt h i sp r o o fi squite similar (though simpler)
to that of the competing specialized banks, which we analyze in detail in the
next section. Hence we only sketch the proof here. Wec o n s i d e ro n l yp u r e
strategies for the customers, using assumption A2.
It can never be that customers who hear ˆ A choose ∼ A and customers
who hear ∼ ˆ A choose A.I fpA >ρ , then the FI would announce ∼ ˆ A always.
By the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, the probability of hearing ˆ A given type
∼ A (P( ˆ A |∼ A))e quals zero. Hence, a customer who hears ˆ A will always
32choose A and type A would deviate. If pA <ρ , there should be full revelation,
but then upon hearing ˆ A, the customer prefers A.
When customers who hear ˆ A choose A a n dc u s t o m e r sw h oh e a r∼ ˆ A
choose ∼ A,t h e ni fpA <ρthe FI will fully reveal. However, since ρ<r
from A1 a customer hearing ∼ ˆ A will always choose A. When pA >ρ ,
the equilibrium will be non-revealing, with the additional requirements that
pA <q R+( 1− q)r and (using Cho-Kreps) pA <r . When customers who
hear ˆ A choose A and customers who hear ∼ ˆ A choose A, there is a fully
revealing equilibrium when pA <r . Lastly, when customers who hear ˆ A
choose ∼ A and customers who hear ∼ ˆ A choose ∼ A, we have partially
revealing equilibria (where type A and type ∼ A mix their strategies). These
a r ep o s s i b l ew h e npA > max[r+P(A | ˆ A)∆,r+P(A |∼ ˆ A)∆]. The minimum
of this maximum is qR+(1−q)r (we derive a very similar result in the proof
of Lemma 4 below).
T h er e s u l t so ft h es i g n a l i n gg a m eg i v eu sap r o ﬁt function for every possi-
ble value of pA. It is easy to see that there are two possible prices that could
maximize the FI’sp r o ﬁt: pA = r which yields πA = r and pA = qR+(1−q)r
which yields πA = r +q∆−(1−q)ρ. Hence, since q>1
2, the highest proﬁts
result when FI A sets pA = qR+(1−q)r and does not reveal any information.
11.1.2 One-stop Monopoly (Proposition 2)
When information revelation is possible, the one-stop bank engages in a
signaling game in which it can recommend product A or product B.T h e
reputation cost ρ is incurred when the one-stop bank lies to the customer
and the customer makes a purchase (of either product). Again, since this
proof is quite similar to the one above and to the competing specialized bank
p r o o f( w h i c hw eg oo v e ri nd e t a i l ) ,w eo n l ys u m m a r i z et h em a i np o i n t s .
First, there can never be any equilibrium where customers who hear ˆ A
choose B and customers who hear ˆ B choose A. When customers who hear
ˆ A choose A a n dc u s t o m e r sw h oh e a r ˆ B choose A, there is a fully revealing
equilibrium where pA − pB < −∆. Wh e nc u s t o m e r sw h oh e a r ˆ A choose B
and customers who hear ˆ B choose B, there is a fully revealing equilibrium
where pA − pB > ∆. Finally, when customers who hear ˆ A choose A and
customers who hear ˆ B choose B, there are two ranges of equilibria17:w h e n
17Note that there doesn’te xist an information revelation equilibrium for certain param-
eter values because we don’t allow for mixed strategies on the part of ﬁrms and work-
ers here due to Assumption 2. We assume that the FI will not price in these regions
33−ρ<p A − pB <ρthe equilibrium is fully revealing and if ρ<(2q − 1)∆,
then when ρ<p A − pB < (2q − 1)∆ the equilibrium is non-revealing with
both types saying ˆ A.
Since prices can never be larger than R without violating individual ratio-
nality, the maximum proﬁts from setting prices in the intervals pA−pB < −∆
and pA − pB > ∆ is r. Maximum proﬁts from setting prices in the interval
ρ<p A−pB < (2q−1)∆ come from setting pA = R (and pB ≥ R−(2q−1)∆),
which yields proﬁts R − (1 − q)ρ. In the interval −ρ<p A − pB <ρsetting
pA = pB = R yields proﬁts of R, which maximizes proﬁts in the interval and
overall.
11.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (Full information)
If pB <p A − ∆,b o t ht y p eA and type B customers prefer to purchase
product B, yielding proﬁts πA =0and πB = pB (and FI B should set price
pB = pA − ∆). If pA − ∆ <p B <p A +∆ ,t y p eA customers prefer product
A and type B customers prefer product B, yielding proﬁts πA = qpA and
πB =( 1 −q)pB (and FI A should set price pB = pA+∆). If pB >p A+∆,b o t h
types of customers prefer to purchase product A, and therefore πB =0and
FI B will never price in this range. Given pA,F IB must decide on its best
response, yielding proﬁts of either pA − ∆ or (1 − q)(pA +∆ ) .F IA clearly
prefers the latter, which leaves it positive proﬁts, so it will set pA at the




11.3 Proof of Lemma 4
We will consider successively the diﬀerent possible equilibria, which can be
completely ordered by customer strategies (a =1 ,b =1 ;a =0 ,b =1 ;
a =1 ,b=0 ;and a =0 ,b=0 )since assumption A2 allows us to disregard
equilibria with interior values for a or b.
• Case 1 (a =1 ,b=0 ) Replacing these values in equations (2)a n d( 3),
we obtain ∆πA(A) > 0 and ∆πA(B) > 0 and there is full revelation
with all customers buying A. The condition ∆UA(  A) > 0 implies then
pA <p B +∆ ,w h i l e∆UA( B) < 0 implies the stronger condition pA <
(−∆ <p A − pB < −ρ and max[ρ,(2q − 1)∆] <p A − pB < ∆).
34pB − ∆ . Asac o n s e quence, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
this equilibrium to occur is pA <p B − ∆,a ss t a t e di np a r t1o ft h e
Lemma.
• Case 2 (a =1 ,b=1 ) Replacing these values in equations (2)a n d( 3),
we obtain ∆πA(A)=pA and ∆πA(B)=−pA+ρ. Asac o n s e quence two
cases are to be considered: pA <ρand pA >ρ(equality is ruled out by
assumption A2). In the ﬁrst case, the equilibrium is fully revealing and
the conditions for a =1 ,b=1to be a solution is that ∆UA(  A) > 0 and
∆UA( B) > 0 is fulﬁlled, so that pB − ∆ <p A <p B +∆ . Using ∆ >ρ
(from assumption A1) allows us to establish part 2 of the Lemma. On
the other hand, if pA >ρthe sign of ∆πA(B) is negative and there is
no equilibrium revelation as every agent is given the message  A. Asa
consequence, the conditional probability p(A |  A)=q, and, by Cho-
Kreps p(B |  B)=1 . Conditions ∆UA(  A) > 0 and ∆UA( B) > 0 imply
∆UA( ˆ A)=( 2 q − 1)∆ − pA + pB > 0 and ∆UA( B)=∆− pB + pA > 0,
proving part 3 of the lemma.
• Case 3 (a =0 ,b=1 , Zero proﬁts for FI A)
i) Replacing these values in equations (2)a n d( 3), we obtain ∆πA(A)=
∆πA(B)=0:These conditions permit the FI to choose any strategy.
To begin with, the FI may play a mixed strategy, with α,β ∈ (0,1).
The inequalities ∆UA( ˆ A) < 0 and ∆UA( B) > 0 hold for these values
of α and β if and only if pA >p B +max[(2P(A | ˆ A) −1)∆, −(2P(B |
ˆ B) − 1)∆].B yd e ﬁnition, for (α,β)  =( 0 ,0) and (α,β)  =( 1 ,1),P(A |
ˆ A)=
αq
αq+β(1−q) and P(B | ˆ B)=
(1−β)(1−q)
(1−α)q+(1−β)(1−q) . Deﬁneψ(α,β) by
ψ(α,β) ≡ max[2
αq
αq+β(1−q) − 1,1 − 2
(1−β)(1−q)
(1−α)q+(1−β)(1−q)]. It can be easily
shown that for α>β, ψ(α,β)=2
αq
αq+β(1−q) − 1. This expression is
increasing in α, implying that the minimum occurs when α = β,w h e n
ψ(α,α)=2 q − 1. Similarly if β>α , ψ(α,β)=1− 2
(1−β)(1−q)
(1−α)q+(1−β)(1−q).
This expression is increasing in β, and its minimum occurs when β = α,
for which ψ(β,β)=2 q − 1. Finally, the maximum of ψ(α,β) is 1.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium where FI A
uses a mixed strategy regarding revelation while customers buy B is
pA >p B+ψ(α,β). Using the minimum and maximum values for ψ(α,β)
establishes part 4ao ft h eLemma and the range of values (α,β) for
w h i c ht h em i x e ds t r a t e g ye quilibrium holds.
35i i )I f ,i n s t e a d ,t h eF Is t r a t e g yi s( α =1 ,β=1 ) , announcing systemati-
cally  A, P(B |  B) is deﬁned by out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and for each
set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs we will obtain a diﬀerent equilibria.
Symmetrically, if (α =0 ,β=0 ) , it is P(A | ˆ A) that will be deﬁned by
out of equilibrium beliefs. Since on the equilibrium path the condition
pA >p B +(2q −1)∆ holds, we now have the second and third parts of
part 4 of the Lemma.
iii) Combining the conclusions of i) and ii) we ﬁnd that if the condition
pA >p B+∆holds, any FI strategy (α,β ∈ [0,1]) will be an equilibrium
where all customers purchase B.T h i si sp a r t5 of the Lemma.
• Case 4 (a =0 ,b =0 )This is never an equilibrium. Indeed, it im-
plies ∆UA(  A) < 0 and ∆UA( B) < 0. Equations (2)a n d( 3), become
∆πA(A)=−pA +ρ and ∆πA(B)=pA > 0. Two cases are therefore to
be considered. If ρ>p A, the equilibrium is fully revealing; if ρ<p A,
the FI only announces  B but the Cho-Kreps criterion allows us to infer
that P(A |  A)=1.So, whatever the case, replacing P(A |  A)=1in ex-
pressions (4)a n d( 5)l e a d st o∆UA(  A)+ ∆UA( B)=∆ ( 2 P(B |  B)) ≥ 0,
which is a contradiction.
11.4 Proof of Proposition 5 (Competing Specialized
Banks, FI A is the price leader)
1) First assume that pB >ρ+∆ . Then the only region where FI B makes
positive proﬁts is pB <p A − (2q − 1)∆. I nt h i sr e g i o nF IA makes zero
proﬁts, so FI A must lower pA such that pB <ρ+∆ .I t c a n d o t h i s b y
setting pA − (2q − 1)∆ <ρ+∆ ,o rpA <ρ+2 q∆.
For ρ<p A <ρ+2 q∆, prices will be such that the equilibrium is non-
revealing and all customers purchase A, or partially revealing and all cus-
tomers purchase B.F IB will manipulate its price so that the second inter-
v a lp e r t a i n si fi tc a n ,w h i c ht h e ni m p l i e sF IA should set its price such that
pA <ρ . However, if ρ<(2q−1)∆ and FI A sets its price equal to (2q−1)∆,
FI B is unable to maneuver its price.
For pA <ρ , the prices will determine whether A fully reveals and everyone
purchases at A (pB >p A +∆ )o rw h e t h e rA fully reveals and everyone
purchases at the bank which matches their type (pB <p A +∆ ). Clearly the
second has more interest for FI B, which then proves our conjecture.
362) First consider the situation where pA >ρ+∆ . Here FI B will clearly
not choose to be in the partially revealing interval where it gets zero proﬁts
(pB >p A − (2q − 1)∆), but the other two regions involve FI A getting zero
proﬁt s ,s oi tm u s tb et h a tpA <ρ+∆ .
Now consider ρ +( 2 q − 1)∆ <p A <ρ+∆ . Unlike above, there is
one region where both ﬁrms make positive proﬁts: pA − ∆ <p B <ρ .F u l l
information is revealed and customers follow the advice. The highest proﬁts
for FI B come from setting its price at the maximum of the interval (ρ)a n d
earning (1−q)ρ. However, the region above is a non-revealing one, in which
all customer purchase at FI B. Proﬁts are maximized for B by choosing the
highest price in the interval, pA − (2q − 1)∆, which yields expected proﬁts
pA − (2q − 1)∆ − qρ. These proﬁts are larger than (1 − q)ρ (taking into
a c c o u n tt h a tw ea r ei nt h er e g i o nρ+(2q−1)∆ <p A <ρ+∆), which means
that pA should be set even lower.
Lastly, setting pA <ρ+( 2 q − 1)∆ can produce two possible responses
from FI B.I f F I B sets pB = pA − ∆,F IB fully reveals information and
g e t sa l lo ft h ec u s t o m e r s .I fF IB sets pB = ρ, it fully reveals and gets the
customers who are the best match at this higher price. FI A only makes
positive proﬁts in this second region, so the solution has FI A setting its
price so that FI B prefers this choice.
3) The proof has the same ﬂavor of the proof when only FI B oﬀers
information, but we need to check at each point what information revelation
regime FI A is in, and whether customers might approach FI A ﬁrst instead.
Consider the situation where pA >ρ+∆ .F IB will not choose to be in
its partially revealing interval (pB >p A − (2q − 1)∆) since it can be shown
that customers will always go to FI A and purchase there, leaving FI B with
zero proﬁts. FI B will choose to be in one of the other two regions, both of
which involve FI A getting zero proﬁt s ,s oi tm u s tb et h a tpA <ρ+∆ .
Now consider ρ+(2q −1)∆ <p A <ρ+∆. Unlike the previous interval,
there is one region where FI B fully reveals and customers follow its advice,
i.e. both ﬁrms will make positive proﬁts: pA − ∆ <p B <ρ(in this region
FI A is in partial revelation regime - pB <ρand ρ +( 2 q − 1)∆ <p A imply
pB+(2q−1)∆ <p A - so all customers will visit FI B ﬁrst). The highest proﬁts
for FI B come from setting its price at the maximum of the interval (ρ)a n d
earning (1−q)ρ. However, the region above is a non-revealing one, in which
all customer approach FI B ﬁrst and purchase there. Proﬁts are maximized
for B by choosing the highest price in the interval, pA−(2q−1)∆, which yields
37expected proﬁts pA − (2q − 1)∆ − qρ. These proﬁts are larger than (1 − q)ρ
( t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tw ea r ei nt h er e g i o nρ+(2q −1)∆ <p A <ρ+∆),
which means that pA should be set even lower.
Lastly, we look at pA <ρ+(2q−1)∆. As before, if FI B sets pB <p A−∆,
FI B fully reveals information and gets all of the customers. For the region
pA −∆ <p B <ρ ,F IB is in a fully revealing regime where customers follow
its advice. Note that for this given range of pB it is weakly dominant for
customers to approach FI B ﬁrst (in fact the only time there is indiﬀerence
is if FI A is in a fully revealing regime as well). Therefore both FI A and FI
B make positive proﬁts in this region. FI A consequently would like to insure
that FI B prefers this region. It is possible hat FI B may want to set its
price even higher than ρ here. If it does so, it will be in a partial revelation
regime. Since it will make zero proﬁts if customers approach it ﬁrst, FI B
needs FI A to be in a full revelation following regime to make proﬁts. For FI
A to be in a full revelation regime there are two possibilities.
The ﬁrst possibility occurs when ρ − (2q − 1)∆ <p B <ρ +∆and
pB − ∆ <p A <ρ . Here it is clear that FI A prefers to set pA as high
as possible (ρ)a n dF IB c a nt h e nf o l l o wb ys e t t i n gpB as high as possible
(ρ +∆ ). Notice here that FI B is free riding oﬀ of the information of FI A
in order to set a higher price. However, proﬁts for FI A would be less than it
would get by pricing higher and forcing FI B to be the information provider
(qρ < qmin[(1 − q)ρ +∆ ,ρ+( 2 q − 1)∆]).
The second possibility occurs when pB <ρ− (2q − 1)∆ and pB − ∆ <
pA <p B +( 2 q − 1)∆. The maximum return for FI B would be setting
pB = ρ−(2q−1)∆,i nw h i c hc a s epA = ρ, however this is also dominated by
the above equilibrium.
11.5 Proof of the payoﬀs in Figure 4 (Competing Spe-
cialized Banks, B is the price leader)
1) Only FI B invests in information: Asl o n ga spB >ρ ,F IA has an incentive
to set its price just below pB +( 2 q − 1)∆, which leads to zero proﬁts for FI
B.I fpB <ρ ,F Im u s tp r i c eb e l o wpB +∆in order to make positive proﬁts.
Therefore the equilibrium is pB = ρ, pA = ρ +∆ .
2)O n l yF IA invests in information: When pB >ρ−(2q −1)∆,t h eb e s t
response for FI A is always to price slightly under pB +( 2 q − 1)∆ and not
reveal any information (always say ˆ A). Since all customers then purchase A,
38this yields proﬁts of zero for FI B.I f ρ<(2q − 1)∆, this is what occurs
and the price of FI B is undetermined, as any price yields zero proﬁts. If
ρ>(2q − 1)∆,t h e nF IB will set its price below ρ − (2q − 1)∆.F IA has
two options, setting a price of pB − ∆,f u l l yr e v e a l i n g ,a n dg e t t i n ga l lo ft h e
customers, or setting a price of ρ, fully revealing but sharing the customers.
FI B clearly prefers the second option and must set pB such that pB−∆ <q ρ
(FI A prefers the second option). Since ρ − (2q − 1)∆ <q ρ+∆ ,F IB sets
its price at ρ − (2q − 1)∆.
3) Both FIs invest in information: When pB >ρ+∆ ,a n yp r i c et h a tF I
A charges which gives it positive proﬁts gives FI B zero proﬁts.
When ρ−(2q−1)∆ <p B <ρ+∆, we must look carefully at the possible
best response of FI A :
• If pB − ∆ <p A <ρ ,F IA will fully reveal with customers taking its
advice. Indeed, FI B will do the same (since pA−(2q−1)∆ <ρ ), so it
does not matter where customers go ﬁrst and the solution (restricting
FI A to this interval) is pB = ρ +∆with proﬁts (1 − q)(ρ +∆ )and
pA = ρ with proﬁts qρ.
• If ρ<p A <p B +(2q−1)∆,F IA reveals nothing and the only possible
c h a n c ef o rb o t ht om a k ep o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts is for FI B to be in a fully
revealing regime. Since the interval for pA implies that pB >p A−(2q−
1)∆,t og e taf u l l yr e v e a l i n gr e g i m ew em u s th a v epA −(2q −1)∆ <ρ .
Hence a candidate solution here is pB = ρ with proﬁts (1 − q)ρ and
pA = ρ+( 2 q − 1)∆with proﬁts q(ρ +( 2 q − 1)∆).
• If pA >p B +( 2 q − 1)∆,F IA is partially revealing. Hence it will only
choose this interval if FI B is fully revealing. The maximum price for
FI B to fully reveal is ρ which limits FI A t oap r i c eo fρ +∆(the
proﬁts are (1 − q)ρ and q(ρ +∆ )for FI B and FI A respectively).
• Lastly, if pA <p B −∆,F IA fully reveals and gets all of the customers.
Hence its proﬁts are pB − ∆.
The proﬁts of pB −∆ for FI A proves that there is a proﬁtable deviation
from the pB = ρ+∆candidate solution. Since FI A prefers to set pA = ρ+∆
(rather than ρ+( 2 q −1)∆) and a deviation downward as before (to ρ−∆)
is impossible, the solution for this interval of pB is pB = ρ and pA = ρ +∆ .
39Finally, any proﬁts gained from FI B setting pB <ρ− (2q − 1)∆ will be
lower than those when pB = ρ b e c a u s eo ft h el o w e rp r i c ea n dt h ef a c tt h a t
FI A will only either share or take all of the customers.
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